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ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO AN 
"APPROPRIATE" EDUCATION: 
THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED 
CHILDREN ACT OF 1975 
Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 197:; 1 in response to the need for increased funding brought 
about by the widespread recognition by courts and state legisla-
tures of the right of handicapped children to an adequate educa-
tion.2 Although the Act sets forth general requirements states 
must meet in order to qualify for receipt of federal funds, it does 
not prescribe the specific educational programs local schools must 
make available in order to fulfill those requirements. Instead, the 
heart of the federal control mechanism is a system of procedural 
.safeguards which provides for parental involvement in educational 
placement decisions. In effect, the Act guarantees procedures 
whereby parents 3 may challenge the appropriateness of their 
child's educational program, but provides only the most general 
guidelines for resolving the substantive questions such challenges 
may present. 
Since the major substantive provisions of the Act have only 
recently gone into effect,4 judicial interpretation has yet to clarify 
those guidelines. The basic purpose of this Note is to suggest some 
pathways through the substantially unexplored terrain of the Act 
and to indicate where the chief obstacles are likely to lie. Part I 
first discusses the forces which led to congressional action. It then 
sets forth the Act's major substantive requirements and outlines 
the procedural system through which complaints will proceed. 
Part II evaluates the Act's procedural system and suggests meas-
ures for improving its effectiveness as a means of enforcing the 
right to an appropriate education. Finally, Part III discusses 
several substantive areas in which complaints seem Hkely to 
arise. This Part attempts to illuminate major areas of potential 
conflict and to suggest factors decisionmakers 5 should consider 
in resolving disagreements between parents and schools. 
1 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 
(1976)). 
2 S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., lSt Sess. 6, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1430. The Senate committee referred to judicial action 
in 2 7 states. Id. 
3 The language of the statute does not specifically limit the right of complaint 
to parents. 20 U.S.C. § l415(b)(1)(E) (1976). See Krass, The Right to Public 
Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. 
ILL. L.F. lOl6, I068. 
4 See p. uo5 infra. 
5 The term "decisionmakers" will be used throughout this Note to mean both 
judges and state or local hearing officers. 
II03 
II04 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92: no3 
This Note is not intended to be an evaluation of the educa-
tional policy decisions Congress made in passing the Act.0 Neither 
does it include detailed consideration of the many alternative 
sources of rights and duties in the area of education for the handi-
capped.7 Finally, questions relating to the Act's funding provi-
sions - treated extensively in other articles 8 - will be noted 
here only briefly. 
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The Act's legislative history clearly discloses the influence of 
a number of "right to education" cases on the legislative process.0 
Although the Supreme Court was never presented with the merits 
of the due process and equal protection issues raised in these 
cases,1° lower federal courts established several bases for a con-
stitutional right to education for handicapped children.11 The 
6 Other articles have dealt at greater length with the advantages and dis-
advantages of various policies incorporated in the Act. See, e.g., Haggerty & 
Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate 
Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 988-93 (1977); Levinson, The Right to a Mi11i111ally 
Adequate Education for Learning Disabled Children, 12 VAL. U.L. REV. 253, 276-
81 ·(1978). 
7 For a discussion of the constitutional theories, see Handel, The Role of the 
Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right to an Effective Mi11i111al 
Education, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 349, 358-67 (1975); Krass, supra note 3, at 1026-42; 
Levinson, supra note 6, at 259-67. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), provides another avenue for litigation. See, e.g., Levinson, 
supra note 6, at 281-84. Cases establishing a "right to treatment" for the invol-
untarily confined may also form a basis for a handicapped child's complaint. Sec, 
e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12u, 1274 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ; McClung, 
"Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Educa-
tion?", 3 J.L. & EDUC. 153, 162-66 (1974). Various state law grounds may also 
exist. See id. at 166-72. 
8 See Note, The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 10 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. IIO, 120-27 (1976). 
9 S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CoNG. 
& AD. NEWS 1425, 1430. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 
(D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 
F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972). For discussions 
of these and other "right to education" cases preceding the Act, see Haggerty & 
Sacks, supra note 6, at 964~4; Handel, supra note 7, at 356-58; Herr, The Chil-
dren Who Wait, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 252, 255-64 
(1976); Krass, supra note 3, at 1026-61; McClung, supra note 7, at 153-61; Note, 
supra note 8, at II3 n.20. 
10 See Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 731 n.102 
(1978). 
11 See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Penn-
sylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. 
Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972). More recent cases have continued 
the trend. See, e.g., Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated 
and remanded, 434 U.S. 808 (1977). 
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scope of rights established through constitutional litigation was 
limited by the nature of the due process and equal protection 
doctrines relied upon by the courts. Due process cases established 
a right to procedural protection - notice and a hearing - before 
a child could be excluded from school or stigmatized by a label 
such as "handicapped" or "retarded." 12 Other cases relied on 
equal protection theories to forbid outright exclusion of handi-
capped children from the educational benefits made available to 
others.13 But while constitutional litigation provided an effective 
weapon for attacking gross inequities such as total exclusion, 
constitutional theories gave courts little guidance in fashioning 
remedies designed to serve the needs of individual children.14 
In passing the Act, Congress codified and expanded the 
broadest procedural rights accorded handicapped children in the 
earlier cases.15 In addition, Congress authorized large annual 
appropriations to aid the states in providing expensive new serv-
ices for the handicapped.16 Finally, the Act gave courts and 
administrative hearing officers broad authority to prescribe the 
details of educational policy i:in individual cases.17 However, its 
broad substantive guidelines did not entirely overcome the diffi-
culty encountered by courts in constitutional litigation in fashion-
ing remedies for individual children. 
Since forty-nine states have elected to participate through 
receipt of federal funds,18 the Act and the regulations issued under 
its authority 19 provide a federal statutory description of a handi-
capped child's right to an education. The Act requires states to 
provi:ide a "free appropriate public education" to all handicapped 
children between the ages of three and eighteen by September l, 
1978, and to all between three and twenty-one by September l, 
1980.20 Included within the definition of handicapped children 
12 See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 
279, 295 (E.D. Pa. r972). 
13 Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972); see Penn-
sylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (E.D. 
Pa. r972). 
14 See Note, supra note 8, at r30. 
15 Compare Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 880-81 (D.D.C. 1972), 
and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 
303-05 (E.D. Pa. r972), with 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). See also Stafford, Educa-
tion for the Handicapped: A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT. L. REv. 7r, 75-76 (1978); 
Note, supra note 8, at n6-r7. 
16 A Senate committee estimated that, on average, a handicapped child is 
twice as e.'l:pensive to educate as a nonhandicapped child. S. REP. No. r68, 94th 
Cong., lSt Sess. 15, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1425, 1439. 
17 See p. no8 & note 37 infra. 
18 New Mexico is the exception. Levinson, supra note 6, at 277. 
19 45 C.F.R. § l2Ia.i-.754 (r977). 
20 20 U.S.C. § 14r2(2) (B) (1976). The Act provides a limited exception for 
children ages three to five and eighteen to twenty-one in some states. Id. 
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are the mentally retarded, learning disabled, physically handi-
capped, and emotionally disturbed.21 
Eschewing any attempt at prescribing specific educational pro-
grams, the Act defines appropriate education as "special educa-
tion and related services which . . . are provided in conformity 
with [an] individualized education program." 22 An individualized 
education program (IEP) is a "written statement for each handi-
capped child" developed at a meeting among the child's parents, 
teacher, and a qualified school representative.23 The statement 
must describe the child's present level of performance, the objec-
tives of the special education program, the specific services which 
will make up that program, and "appropriate objective criteria" 
for determining whether program objectives are being achieved.24 
Exhibiting great faith in the IEP conference to arrive at an ac-
ceptable result, the Act contains no specific guidelines for deter-
mining the substantive content of an appropriate program. To 
direct placement decisions, it does include the requirement that 
handicapped children should be educated together with the non-
handicapped "to the maximum extent appropriate." 25 To reduce 
misclassification of children, the Act prohibits racially or culturally 
biased tests and forbids reliance on any single criterion - such 
as an IQ test- in determining a child's placement.20 
In order to secure the rights of handicapped children, the Act 
establishes detailed procedural safeguards. It grants parents the 
right to present a complaint with regard to "any matter relating to 
the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the 
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to 
such child." 27 Parents are entitled to an "impartial due process 
hearing" before a hearing examiner who is not an employee of the 
agency involved in the education of the child.28 If such a hearing 
initially takes place at the local level,29 an aggrieved party may 
appeal to the state agency for review of the local decision.30 
21 Id. § 1401(1). 
22 Id. § 1401 (18). 
23 Id. § 14or(19). 
2• Id. 
25 Id. § 1412 (5)(B). 
26 Id. § 1412(5){C). 
27 Id. § 1415 (b)(1) (E). 
28 Id. § 1415(b)(2). 
29 Although most states have established procedures whereby an initial hearing 
takes place at the local level and is followed, where necessary, by an appeal to a 
state hearing officer, the Act does not require the two-tiered system. Id. Massa-
chusetts provides for only a single hearing at the state level. MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 71b1 § 3 (West Supp. 1979). 
30 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976). In hearings at both the state and local levels, 
the Act gives parties the right to counsel, the right to present evidence and cross-
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The Act does not specify whether a state appeals examiner is 
to make an entirely independent determination or is to rely on the 
decision of the local hearing examiner if supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. An independent state-level determination 
would provide an important assurance of impartiality, given 
the possible influence of parochial politics and bias on the lo-
cal hearing officer.31 Moreover, since Congress gave state edu-
cational agencies the ultimate responsibility for overseeing local 
compliance,32 a close check on local hearings would serve as 
an effective tool of state regulation. Although a rehearing at the 
state level may add to the effort and expense of the parties, they 
could reduce this burden in appropriate cases by agreeing to rely 
on the record of the original hearing. On balance, these consider-
ations favor a de novo determination by the appeals examiner. 
Where the administrative review procedures fail to resolve 
conflicts, the Act provides that any party aggrieved by a state 
determination may bring a civil action in a state or federal court.33 
examine witnesses, the right to a record of the proceedings, and the right to 
written findings of fact and decisions. Id. § 1415•( d). 
31 See Stafford, supra note 15, at 78. 
32 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1976). See als<> Stafford, supra note 15, at 78. 
33 20 U.S.C. § l415(e) (1976). The Act also includes a "stay put" requirement 
that allows the child to remain in her current placement pending the outcome of 
all administrative and judicial proceedings. Id. § l415(e)(3). A child apply-
ing for initial admission to public school is entitled to be placed in the regular 
school pro;?;ram unless the parents and scliool agree to do otherwise. Id. 
At least one court has enforced the "stay put" requirement without requiring 
the plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies. In Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. 
Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978), the district court enjoined the expulsion of a handi-
capped child and held that the Act's procedure for reevaluation - an IEP con-
ference - provided the sole means for changing the placement of a handicapped 
child. Id. at 1243. While the court left open the possibility of temporary suspen-
sion of a handicapped student in an emergency, id. at 1242, the Nappi approach 
raises several potential difficulties. 
First, children who have not previously been identified as handicapped may 
attempt to claim the Act's protection to avoid expulsion. If courts disallow such 
claims, some children who are in fact handicapped may be denied the full benefit 
of the Act simply because their change of placement has been labeled "discipli-
nary." On the other hand, a preliminary hearing by the court to separate valid 
from invalid claims would thwart the administrative hearing process specified in 
the Act. 
Also, the procedural protections accorded handicapped cliildren under the Act 
may create disparities in the disciplinary treatment of students who have engaged 
in similar conduct. Compare Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 
1978) (procedure for clianging placement of handicapped child following disrupt-
ive incident), with Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (procedure for suspension 
of nonhandicapped student), and Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 
150, 158-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (procedure for expulsion 
of nonhandicapped student). The perception of this disparity by other students 
could undermine the credibility of school disciplinary policies. 
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The court, in addition to receiving the record of the administrative 
hearings, is required to hear additional evidence at the request of 
any party, and to render a decision based on the preponderance of 
the evidence.34 This suggests that the role of the court is to make 
an independent determination and not simply to accept the find-
ings of a hearing officer when supported by substantial evidence.31; 
Of course, this requirement does not prevent the court from con-
sidering the opinions of state and local hearing officers - par-
ticularly where they agree - as an important element of the 
evidence in the case.36 Finally, in fashioning remedies, the court 
is empowered to order "such relief as [it] determines is appro-
priate." 37 
II. THE PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT 
The actual services received by an individual child are not 
specifically prescribed by the Act, but result instead from a con-
sensus arrived at during the IEP conference, or from a decision 
reached by a judge or hearing officer. Congress adopted this ap-
proach for several reasons, the most obvious of which is the im-
mense variety of special needs presented by children with dif-
ferent handicaps. A deaf child has special needs quite unlike 
those of a mentally retarded child. Even the single label "men-
tally retarded" encompasses a broad spectrum of widely divergent 
needs.38 A system of regulations that prescribed a specific pro-
gram for each type of handicap would inevitably ignore important 
34 20 U.S.C. § r4r5 (e)(2) (r976). 
35 See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. I2II, r227 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(court provides a "de novo" hearing). The legislative history supports this inter-
pretation. The original House version of the bill - making findings of fact by 
the state agency conclusive if supported by substantial evidence - was rejected 
by the conference committee and the present language was substituted. S. REP. 
No. 455, 94th Cong., rst Sess. 47-50 (r975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS r480, r500-02. 
36 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951), A court's 
approach is likely to vary depending on the issue in the case. In a case requiring 
the inference of racial discrimination from statistical data- a procedure familiar 
to many courts, see, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. r2u (E.D.N.Y. 
1978) -few judges would defer to the decision of a hearing officer. On the other 
hand, in making factual determinations requiring a more specialized knowledge, 
courts may feel less inclined to substitute their judgment for the conclusions of a 
specially-trained hearing examiner. See Ba2elon, Implementing the Right to Treat-
ment, 36 U. CHL L. REV. 742, 744 (r969). 
37 20 U.S.C. § r4r5(e)(2) (r976). The authority of hearing officers is never 
defined in the Act. Presumably, either a judge or hearing officer could order imple-
mentation of whatever program she deemed appropriate. 
38 See Sorgen, The Classification Process and Its Consequences, in Tm: MEN-
TALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAw 2r5, 2r6 (1976). 
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differences among individuals.39 Another explanation for con-
gressional reluctance to adopt more specific guidelines is the lack 
of agreement among educators as to what programs are most eff ec-
tive for certain handicapped children.40 This lack of consensus 
indicates some need for flexibility and experimentation at the local 
level. 
Perhaps the most significant reason Congress failed to pre-
scribe more specific standards is the traditional notion that educa-
tion is primarily a state and local concern.41 Despite the far-reach-
ing procedural provisions of the present statute, Congress was 
apparently unwilling to take the further step of ordering that 
specific programs be made available - a process that could lead to 
federal allocation of state and local funds. In the end, the hard 
choices required to determine the extent of the rights of particular 
children were consigned to the discretion of local administrators 
and to the judges and hearing officers who review their decisions. 
In entrusting local authorities with the responsibility of 
creating individualized programs for all their handicapped chil-
dren - without providing clearer guidelines as to the substance 
of such programs - Congress may well have expected too much 
of local school administrators. Even assuming good faith on the 
part of school officials in dealing with the problems of handicapped 
children,42 budgetary constraints will inevitably color many deci-
sions and restrict the range of alternatives offered in the formu-
lation of individualized educational programs. Conscious that 
extra dollars spent on special education may be cut from other 
portions of the school budget,43 local school administrators may 
39 Still, greater particularization in some areas seems desirable. For example, 
more explicit testing requirements would be useful. Requiring a basic core of 
evaluation procedures in all cases would provide important protections without 
great expense. See note 69 infra. 
40 See Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical 
Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 47 (r974) ("The response 
to almost any interesting question concerning the education of the handicapped 
is either that the answer is unknown or that no generalizable beneficial effect of a 
given treatment can be demonstrated."). 
41 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, ro4 (r968) ("By and large, 
public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local 
authorities."); I2I CoNG. REc. I9.498 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Dole). 
42 Prejudice against the handicapped may sometimes influence the response 
of teachers and administrators. See, e.g., Martin, Some Thoughts on Mainstream-
ing, in CONTEM:PORARY ISSUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 230, 231 (1977). Racial prej-
udices may also be reflected in placement decisions. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of 
Educ., 456 F. Supp. I2II, 1263-64 (E.DN.Y. r978); MASSACHUSETTS ADVOCACY 
CENTER, DoUPLE JEOPARDY: THE PLIGHT OF MINORITY STUDENTS IN SPECIAL EDU-
CATION (I978). 
43 Funds available from the federal government are not intended to cover the en-
tire cost of educating the handicapped. The amount received by states is determined 
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focus on what is available within the school system rather than on 
what is most appropriate for an individual child. 
Other factors unrelated to a child's needs will also affect the 
programs offered by the school system. One such factor may be 
the lack of expertise of teachers and administrators.44 Another 
may be the workload of school administrators who must help 
formulate and implement individualized education programs. 
Often they may cut corners,45 or attempt to persuade parents that 
their child does not require special programs, simply because they 
have no time to deal with the problem.46 
Of course, clearer substantive guidelines would not add more 
dollars to the budget or more hours to the administrator's day. 
But a local official is less likely to ignore a clear statutory man-
date - violation of which could threaten the receipt of federal 
funds 47 -than to bend flexible rules. Moreover, the threat of a 
parental complaint would be more credible where clear regula-
tions made it apparent that the child's rights were being denied. 
Ideally, a parental complaint procedure would provide a realis-
tic enforcement mechanism even in the face of ambiguous stand-
ards. In practice, however, the voices of many parents may never 
be heard. Whether through deference to the experience and 
expertise of educators, or because ignorance of handicapping con-
by multiplying the number of handicapped students identified and served by a fixed 
dollar figure- determined each year by calculating a certain percentage of the 
average per pupil e."'penditure in the nation. 20 U.S.C. § l4II(a)(1) (1976). 
Most of this money is then distributed to localities solely on the basis of the 
number of children they serve, with no regard for the nature of the handicaps 
involved. Id. § l4II(d) (1976). Localities therefore have an incentive to identify 
handicapped children but not to place them in expensive programs. A school 
system may receive no more federal money for a child placed in a $20,000 per 
year full-time residential program than it does for a child who requires $200 worth 
of special reading instruction in the regular public school. A federal funding 
scheme responsive to the level of special services a local system provides would 
remove some of the financial pressure that now influences placement decisions. 
44 The majority of public school teachers in the United States have little or no 
training in educating the handicapped. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ED-
UCATION PROFESSIONS DEVELOPMENT, MAINSTREAMING: HELPING TEACHERS MEET 
THE CHALLENGE 18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MAINSTREAMING]. 
45 The most likely method of cutting corners will be standardization of admin-
istrative functions. See Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 40, at 47; p. lilI 
infra. Such a response is particularly troublesome because of the importance of 
individualization in educating the handicapped. 
46 See R. WEATHERLEY & M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND INSTITU-
TIONAL INNOVATION 60-62 (1977). The additional paperwork which administrators 
must complete as a result of legislative requirements may exacerbate the problem. 
Id. 
47 See 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (1976). 
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ditions renders their expectations of their child too low,48 many 
parents may rely without question on the judgment of teachers 
and school officials in making placement decisions.49 As a result, 
the discretion of local administrators will often go unchecked. 
This problem is particularly acute in the case of poorer and 
less educated parents.50 Such parents may defer to the judgment 
of school officials because they cannot adequately understand the 
complex issues involved in placement decisions,51 or because they 
do not know their rights under the Act.52 Similarly, poor parents 
may forego a challenge because they cannot afford the time away 
from work or the cost of an attorney. Since class differences 
parallel racial differences in many areas, the problem of the pas-
sive parent may contribute to the disproportionate assignment of 
minority students to less favorable educational placements.53 
Given the importance of the parental complaint mechanism as 
a means for enforcing substantive rights, it is necessary to seek 
new methods for increasing the effectiveness and accessibility of 
that mechanism. Probably the most effective means would be to 
make certain that all parents receive sufficient notice of their 
children's rights before any action is taken by the school. For 
reasons of administrative convenience, schools may formulate 
IEP's on a mass production basis and present them to parents as 
a fait accompli.54 Uninformed parents may be unaware that 
alternative programs exist. Judges and hearing officers can help 
deter such abuses by carefully scrutinizing the procedures fol-
lowed by schools in all cases. They should make certain that 
parents are notified before any school action is taken, that the 
notice clearly explains the rights of students and the alternative 
placements available,55 and that every opportunity is given parents 
to take part in the IEP formulation process. Strict adherence to 
48 See Krass, supra note 3, at 1018-19 n.18; S. REP. No. 168, 94th CONG., lSt 
Sess. 9, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1430. 
49 See R. WEATHERLEY & M. LIPSKY, supra note 46, at 51 & n.87; cf. Debate 
Rises on Mandatory School Plans for Handicapped, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1979, 
at Aro, col. I (reporting low instance of parental complaints). 
50 See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1252-53, 1256 (E.DN.Y. 
1978); Sorgen, supra note 38, at 237-38. 
51 In some instances the complexity may be created by educators whose special-
ized jargon awes parents into silent acquiescence. See R. WEATHERLEY & M. LIP-
SKY, s1tpra note 46, at 53. 
52 See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12II, 1252-53 (E.DN.Y. 1978). 
53 See id. at 1256. 
54 See Debate Rises on Mandatory School Plans for Handicapped, supra note 
49, at Axe, col. 2. 
55 The court in Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. I2II (E.DN.Y. 1978), 
suggested that the parties call upon communications experts to develop materials 
comprehensible to the poorly educated. Id. at 1295. 
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procedural requirements would provide strong evidence of a 
school's good faith in attempting to comply with the Act. On the 
other hand, a haphazard approach to procedural safeguards should 
lead a decisionmaker to view the assertions of school authorities 
with suspicion. 
To increase the attractiveness of the complaint system to low 
and moderate income parents, steps should be taken to reduce the 
cost of complaints. States might consider providing attorneys or 
advisers 56 to complaining parents free of charge. As an alterna· 
tive, Congress might authorize the awarding of attorney's fees to 
successful complainants.57 A less expensive option may be to bar 
school attorneys from participating in administrative hearings 
where the parents are not represented by counsel.58 This may 
reduce the adversarial nature of the hear:ing and encourage the 
hearing examiner to adopt a more active role as mediator between 
the parties. In addition, where a child's evaluation is challenged, 
parents should have the right to obtain an independent evaluation 
at no expense to themselves.59 The present regulations leave this 
right in an unacceptably uncertain status.60 
Finally, class actions may provide an effective mechanism for 
overcoming the problems of parental inaction under some circum· 
stances. Parental advocacy groups might sponsor class actions to 
challenge system-wide inadequacies. For example, a charge that 
a school system's evaluation procedures were racially biased 
56 In administrative hearings, trained nonlawyers may be more effective and 
less expensive than attorneys with little experience in this specialized area. The 
Act provides parents the right not only to legal counsel, but to anyone "with 
special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of handicapped chil-
dren." 20 U.S.C. § I4I5(d) (I976). 
57 The disadvantage of this approach is that money spent for attorneys might 
reduce the funds available for educational services. Absent congressional authori-
zation, a court could award attorney's fees only in very limited circumstances. See 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 42I U.S. 240 (I975); IO C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2675, at 32 (Supp. 
I979). 
58 New York City follows this approach. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. 
Supp. I2II, I24I (E.D.N.Y. I978). 
59 Such a right may be expensive if parents are given an unconditional right 
to choose the specialist to do the evaluation. Massachusetts addressed this prob-
lem by providing the right to a free evaluation from any facility approved by 
the state. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7IB, § 3 (West Supp. I979). 
60 The regulations provide for an independent evaluation at public expense 
1mless the local agency first requests a hearing on the adequacy of the original 
evaluation and the hearing officer upholds the appropriateness of that evaluation. 
45 C.F.R. § 12Ia.503 {I977). In addition to creating delay by adding another 
hearing to the process, this provision only gives protection against evaluations 
which fail to conform to the formal requirements of the Act. It would be difficult 
for a hearing officer to detect bias or error on the part of the original evaluator 
without an independent conclusion against which to compare the original. 
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would almost necessarily be brought as a class action.61 How-
ever, the Act makes no specific provision for the bringing of class 
actions. It is uncertain under what circumstances a class action 
may be brought under the Act.62 
III. GUIDELINES TO DECISIONMAKING: DETERMINING 
THE ScoPE OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE AcT 
Despite its shortcomings, the parental complaint system is the 
primary mechanism for enforcing substantive rights under the 
Act.63 The nature of the educational services received by all 
handicapped children will therefore depend to a great extent on 
the response of judges and hearing examiners who deal with indivi-
dual complaints. The Act's broad-brush guidelines, whHe permit-
.ting a flexible response to individual problems at the local level, 
render the task of thes~ decisionmakers exceedingly difficult. 
At this early stage in the history of the Act,64 there is little 
authority- either scholarly or judicial - which would aid in the 
61 See p. n16 infra. 
62 The administrative rulemakers refused to comment on the question. See 
42 Fed. Reg. 42,512 (1977). The Act gives courts jurisdiction over actions brought 
by any party aggrieved by the decision of a state hearing examiner. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(e)(2) (1976). Courts could interpret this provision to require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies by all members of a plaintiff class. Cf. Weinberger v. 
Salli, 422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1975) (court had no jurisdiction to determine claims 
of unnamed class members who failed to pursue administrative remedies under 
§ 205 (g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976)). A preferable ap-
proach would be to recognize that some of the Act's provisions may go unenforced 
unless courts can grant system-wide relief in class actions. See p. 1u6 infra. This 
approach would also avoid the unnecessary burden of numerous administrative 
complaints on a single issue. Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 
n.8 (1975) (awarding back pay to unnamed plaintiffs who had not fulfilled admin-
istrative requirements for bringing suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe to 
2oooe-17 (1976)). It seems probable that at least the class representatives must 
exhaust the administrative remedies. See id. 
In Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12n ·(E.DN.Y. 1978), the court 
ruled on several claims under the Act despite the apparent failure of any plaintiffs 
to pursue administrative remedies. Id. at 1291-92. The court avoided the exhaus-
tion issue altogether. Id. at 1216 ("This is essentially a constitutional and not a 
statutory case . . . . Defendants' strong reliance on exhaustion cases is, therefore, 
inappropriate."). 
63 Other mechanisms do exist. Each state has an obligation to withhold federal 
funds from local school systems that fail to comply with the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 
(b) (2) (1976). While such review may be useful in controlling system-wide 
abuses, it seems unlikely that a state could commit sufficient resources to monitor 
inadequacies in individual programs. 
64 The effective date for the section of the Act establishing procedural safe-
guards was October l, 1977· Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 8(c) (1975). See Eberle v. 
Board of Pub. Educ., 444 F. Supp. 41 (W.D. Pa. 1977). 
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application of the Act's broad principles to specific cases.00 How-
ever, even in the absence of more fully developed case law, it is 
possible to predict major areas of potential conflict. An investi-
gation of several areas where complaints seem likely to arise will 
illuminate troublesome issues and point the way toward possible 
solutions. 
A. Complaints Regarding Evaluation 
Those portions of the Act which prescribe standards for 
evaluation of children provide a few clear guidelines. The Act 
proscribes racially or culturally biased evaluation procedures,00 
requires that tests be administered in a child's native language,07 
and provides that no single procedure shall be the sole criterion 
for determining the placement of a child.68 Even given these 
guidelines, however, decisionmakers face difficult factual in-
quiries in determining what constitutes an adequate evaluation in 
individual cases. Moreover, the clear prohibition of biased evalu-
ation procedures does not eliminate the difficulty of establishing 
standards of proof or fashioning remedies in discrimination cases. 
1. Inaccurate or Incomplete Evaluations. - Complaints re-
garding the evaluation of an individual child may take several 
forms. For example, some parents may assert that their child's 
evaluation was incomplete because the school omitted particular 
tests which would provide a clearer picture of the child's needs. 
Beyond the prohibition of reliance on a single criterion for place-
ment, neither the statute nor the regulations attempt to define 
how many or what types of tests must form the basis of a place-
ment decision.69 The regulations call for assessment "in all areas 
related to the suspected disability." 70 Several considerations sug-
gest that decisionmakers should construe this requirement broadly. 
The suspected disability may be only distantly related to the 
actual disability, and only a broad range of tests could uncover 
65 Several articles discuss the Act's substantive provisions. See, e.g., Krass, 
supra note 3, at 1063-77; Levinson, supra note 61 at 276-81; Note, supra note 
8, at 135-s2. 
66 20 u.s.c. § 1412(5)(C) (1976). 
67 Id. Students with hearing or speech difficulties axe to be given tests in their 
own "mode of communication,'' id., to ensure that test results which purport 
to measure aptitude do not actually reflect an inability to communicate. See 45 
C.F.R. § 121a.532(c) (1977). 
68 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(C) (1976). 
69 A statutory requirement that certain basic assessments be made in every 
case, coupled with more specialized inquiries into the area of suspected disability, 
seems preferable to the general language of the present provisions. Cf. MAss. GEN. 
LAws ANN. ch. 71B, § 3 (West Supp. 1979) (requiring evaluations at least by a 
teacher, a physician, a psychologist, and a nurse or social worker). 
70 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532 (f) (1977). 
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the real problem. A child with multiple handicaps might be 
classified only under the most obvious one. Since the consequences 
of misclassification far outweigh the cost of more extensive evalu-
ation,71 decisionmakers should be extremely liberal in ordering 
additional tests when requested. 
In other instances parents may complain not that an evalu-
ation rests on incomplete testing procedures, but that the out-
come of an evaluation is simply inaccurate.72 When such com-
plaints arise, hearing officers and judges may confront the task of 
choosing between highly technica:l arguments presented by experts 
from both sides. Despite the difficulty of such inquiries, disagree-
ment among experts provides no justification for avoiding hard 
questions altogether.73 Courts undertake equally complex in-
quiries in many other areas.74 Moreover, where the evaluation of 
an individual child is at issue, there is little reason to fear that 
hard choices will result in system-wide adherence to potentially 
unsound policies and stifle local creativity. Given the unlimited 
variety of handicapping conditions, it seems unlikely that a 
factual determination regarding the accuracy of an individual 
evaluation could have far-reaching precedential impact. 
2. Racially or Culturally Biased Evaluation Procedures: The 
Testing Quagmire. - In the past, much of the controversy over 
evaluation has centered around the use of racially and culturally 
biased testing procedures.75 Although such procedures apparently 
continue to receive widespread use,76 challenges to biased testing 
may seldom arise through individual complaints. Parents will often 
be reluctant to challenge the apparently "scientific" results of a 
71 See Sorgen, supra note 38, at 218-19. 
72 It might be argued in response that decisionmakers are empowered to do 
no more than ascertain whether the Act's explicit requirements are fulfilled. Under 
such an interpretation, any nondiscriminatory process which incorporated two 
or more placement criteria - no matter how unreliable - would be beyond chal-
lenge. If the protections of the Act are so limited, then it is not clear why Con-
gress provided the right to an independent evaluation, see 20 U.S.C. § l415(b)(1) 
(A) (1976). Moreover, to ignore potential inaccuracies is to overlook a funda-
mental purpose of due process safeguards - to guard against erroneous judgments. 
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976). 
73 While technical complexity and disagreement among experts may justify 
judicial deference to the views of a qualified administrative hearing examiner, see 
Bazelon, supra note 36, at 744, they cannot justify a policy under which a hearing 
officer defers to the position of a party in interest, such as the school. 
74 See Bazelon, supra note 36, at 744. 
75 See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 502 
F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 478-92 (D.D.C. 
1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
76 See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1243, 1285-86 (E.D.N.Y. 
1978). 
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standardized test.77 More significantly, a charge that a particular 
procedure is discriminatory would be difficult to establish without 
reference to the impact of the procedure beyond the case of an 
individual child. Individual parents will seldom possess the 
energy, knowledge, or financial resources necessary to undertake 
a system-wide investigation. Thus, the Act's procedural system -
designed to resolve complaints concerning individual children -
provides a poorly suited mechanism for attacking problems that 
affect an entire local system or perhaps an entire state.78 Earlier 
challenges to discriminatory testing have come through class 
actions.79 Only to the extent that courts are willing to entertain 
such class actions under the Act 80 will the antidiscrimination 
provision provide an effective weapon for advocates.81 
Lf such challenges arise, they will probably rely on statistical 
proof of racially disproportionate impact to establish a charge of 
discrimination.82 Courts must then determine what effect is to be 
given to such a showing. With respect to the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis 83 that, 
absent proof of discriminatory intent on the part of a defendant, 
disproportionate impact will be insufficient to establish a violation 
of equal protection.84 The Court distinguished cases under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.85 Five years earlier, in Griggs 
77 See Sorgen, supra note 38, at 231; cf. R. WEATHERLEY & M. LIPSKY, s11pra 
note 46, at 53 ("technical jargon lends an aura of science to the [IEP conference] 
while making much of the discussion unintelligible to the parent"). 
78 For this reason, other mechanisms of enforcement may be especially im-
portant. If states are to fulfill their statutory obligation to eliminate discrimina-
tion in evaluation procedures, see 20 U.S.C. § l412(5)(C) '(1976), then state agen-
cies must closely monitor the racial composition of various educational placements 
at the local level and investigate instances of disproportionate assignment by race. 
Cf. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71B, § 6 (West Supp. 1979) •(requiring state De-
partment of Education to make such investigations). 
79 See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. l2II (E.D.N.Y. 1978); 
Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afj'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th 
Cir. 1974). 
so See note 62 supra. 
81 Of course, other grounds are available for attacking biased testing. Cases 
have relied on equal protection, see, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. 
Cal. 1972), aff'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974); Hobson ·v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 
401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 
1969), and on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ood to 
20ood-4 (1976), see Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. l2Il, 1277-78, 1292 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978). Title VI may provide a preferred basis since it would not re-
quire a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the school district, see 
id. at 1277. 
82 See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. l2II (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
83 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
84 Id. at 238-39. 
85 Id. at 246-48. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe to 2oooe-17 (1976). 
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v. Duke Power Co.,86 the Court had ruled that disproportionate 
impact alone is enough to establish a prima fade case of illegal 
discrimination under Title VII.87 In Griggs, the Court noted that 
the purpose of Title VII was to "achieve equality of employment 
opportunities," 88 and to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and un-
necessary barriers" to employment of minorities.89 An inquiry 
into the purposes of the Handicapped Act suggests that the 
Griggs standard should apply to the Act's antidiscrimination pro-
vision. Litigation prior to the Act revealed that discriminatory 
testing procedures created a barrier to equal educational oppor-
tunity for minorities.90 Since one aim of the Act was to remedy 
that inequity, and since the Act's language is phrased in terms of 
effect rather than motivation,91 racially disproportionate impact 
should suffice to establish a prima fade case of discriminatory 
·evaluation under the Act. 
Once such a prima fade violation has been established, the 
burden of proof shifts to the school to justify its procedures.92 Un-
like tests in the employment context,93 however, educational evalu-
ation procedures cannot be defended by proving that they are 
valid predictors of future performance.94 Courts have recognized 
that educational testing results may be nothing more than self-
fulfilling prophecies.95 Biased tests may be accurate predictors of 
educational progress simply because test results shape the expecta-
tions of both teachers and students.96 Schools could justify the 
continued use of challenged procedures only by proof that racially 
disproportionate placements resulted from environmental factors 
beyond the control of the school. 97 
86 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
87 Id. at 430-31. 
88 Id, at 429, 
89 Id. at 431. 
90 See H-0bson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), afj'd sub nom. 
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
91 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5) (C) (1976) (evaluation procedures must be selected 
and administered "so as not ta be •.. discriminatory" (emphasis added)). 
92 See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12u, 1277 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
93 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
94 Sorgen, supra note 38, at 231-32. 
95 See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 491 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. 
Smuck v. Hobson, 4o8 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (noting "the likelihood that the 
student will act out [the testing] judgment and confirm it by achieving only at 
the expected level" (footnote omitted)) ; Sorgen, supra note 38, at 219 (manner in 
which a school treats different children a more significant determinant of pupil 
performance than the initial bases for classification). 
96 Rosenthal & Jacobson, Teacher Expectation for the Disadvantaged, SCIEN-
TIFIC .AMERICAN, April 1968, at 19; Sorgen, supra note 38, at 219. 
97 For example, a school may show that children raised in a ghetto environment 
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Even after a plaintiff prevails in a challenge to testing pro-
cedures, the most difficult problem of all may still remain. The 
science of educational testing is not so finely developed that clear 
remedies will ·be readily available in all cases. 08 Where courts or 
hearing officers order an end to discriminatory procedures, school 
systems may be hard-pressed to produce a nondiscriminatory sub-
stitute. Biased standardized tests may be replaced by an un-
certain set of highly subjective <:riteria which leave broad discre-
tion in the hands of individual educators. Under such circum-
stances, personal biases - either conscious or unconscious - can 
produce a different form of discrimination.00 Because of the 
absence of clear solutions, the evaluation area calls for particular 
caution in the formulation of remedies. Courts may find them-
selves relying heavily on the efforts of the parties to arrive at 
acceptable solutions.100 Often, the proper function of the judge or 
hearing officer may be to serve as a catalyst for cooperation 
between the parties and to ensure that schools endeavor in good 
faith to devise practical alternatives to discriminatory procedures. 
B. Placement Decisions: The "Mainstreaming" Controversy 
Conflicts over the actual services necessary to constitute an 
"appropriate" educational program will present perhaps the 
most difficult issues arising under the Act. Such conflicts give rise . 
to two types of questions. First, what is the proper environment 
in which to educate a handicapped child? And second, what par-
ticular services must be delivered to that child? This Section 
will deal with the former question. The more general question of 
determining the "appropriate" level of services will be addressed 
in the final Section. 
The Handicapped Act's endorsement of the concept of "main-
streaming" 101 is perhaps its most controversial feature.102 The 
are more likely to suffer emotional disturbances than other children. See Lora v. 
Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12u, 1256-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
98 See id. at 1247 ("[I]t is too early to expect professional agreement on stand-
ardization in the [classification] field. . . . Courts are not in a position to lead 
the most advanced of the educators, clinicians and theoreticians in enforcing non-
existent standards."). 
99 See id. at 1245. Even where tests themselves are nondiscriminatory, personal 
biases may have an impact on the process of referring children for initial evalua-
tion. See id. at 1263-64. 
100 See id. at 1294. 
101 Commentators have objected to the use of the term "mainstreaming" in 
describing the Act, claiming it denotes indiscriminate placement of all handicapped 
children in regular classrooms. See Stafford, supra note 15, at 76. The term is 
used throughout this Section to mean a general policy favoring regular class 
placement of handicapped children in appropriate circumstances. 
102 See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 12n, 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 
1979] APPROPRIATE EDUCATION III9 
only guideline Congress provided for determining what constitutes 
an appropriate placement is the admonition that handicapped 
children should be educated together with the nonhandicapped 
"to the maximum extent appropriate." 103 Special classes or seg-
regated environments are limited to cases in which "the nature or 
severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes 
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily." 104 Thus, the statute appears to place the burden 
of persuasion on any party - either parent or school - seeking 
to remove the child from the regular educational environment. 
However, the Act provides little guidance for determining at what 
point education in the regular classroom becomes unsatisfactory. 
A discussion of the history of the mainstreaming concept in both 
the legal and the educational contexts may serve to illuminate 
.both the policies supporting the concept and the problems in-
herent in its application. An understanding of this background 
suggests several factors decisionmakers might consider in deter-
mining when placement in the regular classroom is appropriate. 
In the sixties and early seventies, a number of educators began 
a movement toward increased integration of handicapped students 
into regular classrooms.105 These educators questioned the eff ec-
tiveness of the traditional practice of educating the handicapped -
especially the mildly mentally retarded - in separate schools or 
separate classes.106 More significantly, they argued that by label-
ing a child "handicapped" or "retarded" and removing that child 
from the regular classroom, a school places a stigma upon that 
child that far outweighs the dubious benefits of separate classes.107 
In addition, noting that special clru?S placement often meant 
permanent assignment to an environment in which minimal skills 
were taught and minimal accomplishment was expected, some 
educators looked to mainstreaming as a solution to the problem 
1978); MAINSTREAMING, supra note 44, at 1-2; Greenberg & Doolittle, Can Schools 
Speak the Language of the Deaf?, N.Y. Times, Dec. II, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 
50-52; Schools Are Forced to Pay More Attention to Disabled, N.Y. Times, May 
II, 1977, at A2o, col. 2. 
103 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5) (B) (1976) · 
104 Id. 
105 See, e.g., Dunn, Special Ed11Cation for the Mildly Retarded- Is Much of 
It Justifiable?, 35 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5 (1968) ; Reynolds, A Framework for 
Considering Some Issues in Special Education, 28 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 367 
(1962). 
106 Actually, the "traditional" practice of educating handicapped children in 
special classes began only in this century. See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded 
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Johnson, 
Special Education for the Mentally Handicapped-Paradox, 29 EXCEPTIONAL 
CHILDREN 62, 62-66 (1962). Prior to this time, many handicapped children were 
simply excluded from scltool altogether. Dunn, supra note 105, at 5. 
107 See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 105, at 9. 
II20 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92: uo3 
of misclassification.108 Finally, some objected that special classes 
had become a tool for maintaining racial segregation.100 
None of these early proponents argued that regular classroom 
placement was right for all handicapped children all of the time. 
Instead, they urged schools to provide a flexible system for deal-
ing with children with widely divergent needs. Such a system 
would include a continuum of alternative placements from the 
"least restrictive" - the regular classroom - to the "most re-
strictive" - full-time residence in an institutionY0 A handi-
capped child would be placed in the least restrictive educational 
setting in which she could successfully function. 
The concept of mainstreaming gained legal significance follow-
ing the consent decree in Pensylvania Association for Retarded 
Children [PARC] v. Pennsylvania,m a case that had widespread 
influence on later developments. The court order in PARC in-
cluded the requirement that "among the alternative programs of 
education . . . available, placement in a regular public school 
class is preferable . . . to placement in any other type of pro-
gram." 112 Echoing the arguments of many educators that 
placement of retarded children in separate classes gives rise to 
social stigma,113 plaintiffs in PARC contended that due process 
requires certain procedural safeguards before a state may classify 
an individual in a manner that is stigmatizing.114 Under this 
theory, a handicapped child would be presumed to be correctly 
placed in a normal classroom. If the school desired to move the 
child into a separated environment, it could do so only after 
providing a hearing for the child's parents.rn Although the 
Supreme Court's more recent decision in Paul v. Davis 116 has 
cast doubt on the stigma rationale as a trigger to due process safe-
guards, 117 the argument was widely accepted at the time of PARC 
108 See Paul, Mainstreaming Emotionally Disturbed Children, in MAINSTREAM-
ING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN 1, 8 (1977). 
109 See Dunn, supra note 105. 
110 See Abeson, EdttCation for Handicapped Children in the Least Restrictive 
Environment, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 514, 516-20 
(M. Kindred ed. 1976) ; Reynolds, supra note 105. 
111 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972). 
A similar doctrine emerged in cases requiring treatment for civilly committed men-
tal patients in the least restrictive environment. See Chambers, The Principle of 
the Least Restrictive Alternative: The Constitutional Issues, in THE MENTALLY 
RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 486 (M. Kindred ed. 1976). 
112 334 F. Supp. at 1260. 
113 See pp. n1g-20 supra. 
114 See 343 F. Supp. at 295. 
115 Jd. 
116 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
117 In finding that the plaintiffs had a "colorable" due process claim, the 
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and was codified in the procedural requirements of the Act.118 
The chief concern motivating the court and plaintiffs in 
PARC,119 as well as the educators who began the mainstreaming 
movement,120 was the widespread practice of "dumping" - placing 
handicapped children into inadequate special classes 121 in order 
to rid teachers and school officials of the problem of dealing with 
the children's special needs. It was against the background of 
such concerns that Congress passed the Act. 
More recently, the mainstreaming doctrine has encountered 
criticism from a number of sources. Critics have asserted that 
mainstreaming handicapped children without major changes in 
the size and structure of regular classes places impossible demands 
upon the teacher and may lead to neglect of the needs of all stu-
dents.122 Some specialists have voiced the fear that emphasis on 
mainstreaming is diverting necessary funds from the types of 
special programs that may be most helpful to many handicapped 
students.123 Others have argued that the isolation resulting from 
being "different" in a class where others are perceived as "normal" 
can be more damaging than the stigma of separation.124 To the 
extent that these fears materialize in actual practice, many com-
plaints under the Act may not assert that children are being ex-
cluded from the classroom, but that they are being improperly 
"dumped" into regular classrooms when at least some separate 
services might be more worthwhile.125 
PARC court relied on Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), a case 
holding that a state must provide notice and a hearing before publicly posting -
and stigmatizing- the names of alleged drunkards, id. at 436. Pennsylvania Ass'n 
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
The constitutional validity of the Constantineau holding has been cast in serious 
doubt by Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701--<>2 (1976) (:finding no violation of due 
process when police labeled plaintiff an "active shoplifter" without notice or hear-
ing). 
118 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). 
119 See 343 F. Supp. at 294. 
120 See Dunn, supra note 105, at 20. 
121 For a description of such a class, see Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 
(S.D. W. Va. 1976). 
122 See, e.g., Greenberg & Doolittle, supra note 102, at 50; Milofsky, Schooling 
tlte Kids No One Wants, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 25, 28. A 
major problem is that most classroom teachers are inadequately prepared to deal 
with special-needs children. See MAINSTREAMING, supra note 44, at 18-19. 
123 See Greenberg & Doolittle, supra note 1021 at 102. 
124 See id. at 82. 
125 One state official noted that the vast majority of parental complaints seek 
additional services for their children while only a few seek regular class place-
ment. Interview with Stephen Bardige, Assistant Director, Bureau of Special 
Education Appeals, Massachusetts Department of Education, in Boston (January 
3, 1979). 
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Judges and hearing officers face a difficult task in attempting 
to reconcile the Act's maximum integration requirement with the 
concerns reflected in such complaints. Still, the Act clearly ex-
presses the congressional policy that integration is to be the gov-
erning principle in placement decisions.126 Perhaps the best ap-
proach for decisionmakers in this area is to apply the maximum 
integration provision as a rebuttable presumption that every child 
is properly placed in the regular classroom. Then, keeping in mind 
the concerns which motivated the mainstreaming movement as 
well as the potential problems which can arise from regular class-
room placement, decisionmakers must weigh the various factors 
which could render such placement unsatisfactory.127 The follow-
ing discussion attempts to illuminate several such factors. 
First, placement in a regular classroom in some cases may be 
unsatisfactory because an alternative placement offers a promise 
of significantly greater academic benefit. This factor must be 
cautiously weighed. The legislative policy in favor of integration 
should not give way to baseless fears of academic disaster. The 
party wishing to place a child outside the regular classroom 
must present clear objective evidence indicating why such a place-
ment should be favored. Also, a decisionmaker should keep in 
mind that the maximum integration provision requires more than a 
mere comparing of academic benefits. Regular classroom place-
ment does not become unsatisfactory simply because it is not, from 
an academic standpoint, the best placement available. Decision-
makers must weigh any potential academic benefit of special class 
placement against the possible social or psychological detriment 
that may result from the separation of a child from her nonhandi-
capped peers.128 A showing that placement outside the regular 
classroom promises only a marginal advantage in academic terms 
should be insufficient to overcome the maximum integration pre-
sumption. Finally, decisionmakers should keep in mind that 
regular class placement need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. 
Full-time special class placement should never be ordered where 
part-time removal from the regular class would suffice. 
Frequent major disruptions of a class by a handicapped stu-
dent might also render regular class placement unsatisfactory.120 
Once again, the party seeking removal from the normal environ-
ment should have the burden of proof. In particular, a decision-
maker should not inf er a likelihood of disruptive behavior from 
126 See Stafford, supra note 15, at 76. 
127 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5) (B) (1976). 
128 See p. nx9 supra. 
129 See 45 C.F.R. § 121a.552 ·(1977) (comment). 
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the nature of a child's handicap alone.130 A clear history of past 
misconduct should be required. Of course, decisionmakers must 
be careful to distinguish cases of disruptive behavior by a handi-
capped child from instances of disruption resulting from the re-
actions of other children to the presence of a handicapped stu-
dent.131 
Where a history of misconduct is established, the inquiry may 
become even more complex. Past disruptiveness may have resulted 
in part from inappropriate educational services. Therefore, a deci-
sionmaker should be reluctant to order removal from the regular 
class where a school has made no previous effort to accommodate 
the special needs of a child within the regular classroom. Still, 
placement of a previously disruptive child in the regular classroom 
over the protest of school authorities may often mean returning 
the child to a hostile environment. While such hostility provides 
no basis for discounting the rights of the child,132 it cannot realis-
tically be ignored. Decisionmakers must search for measures to 
reduce possible hostility and assure that regular class placement 
is given a fair chance to succeed.133 
A final factor that must be considered in determining the 
appropriateness of regular class placement is the education of the 
nonhandicapped child. By increasing the demands on the class-
room teacher, the presence of a handicapped child might diminish 
the quality of the education offered to all students in the class. 
Much of the recent criticism of mainstreaming has focused on 
this problem.134 To the extent that mainstreaming is implemented 
without proper adjustments in the educational environment, 
integration may be a disaster not only for the handicapped stu-
dent, but for her nonhandicapped peers as well. At the same time, 
the rights of handicapped children should not be sacrificed in 
130 Predictions of future disruptive behavior are sometimes unreliable and 
should be subjected to careful scrutiny. See Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: 
A Suggested Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 51 TEX. L. REv. 1277, 1305-
07 (1973). 
131 Nonhandicapped children may react out of prejudice or discomfort at the 
presence of a handicapped child. The rights of handicapped children should not 
be circumvented by reference .to such prejudices. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 
1, 7 (1958) (hostility toward integration not a factor for consideration by district 
court in determining relief); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 
1023 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (likelihood of hostile reaction by neighbors no justification 
for refusing relief under Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619 (1976)), modified, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 
(1978). 
132 See note 131 supra. 
133 Such measures might include ordering frequent parent-teacher conferences 
or requiring assignment of the student to a teacher who had not witnessed the 
previous disruptive behavior. 
134 See p. u21 & note 122 supra. 
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every case of potential conflict with those of more advantaged 
children. 
Since the Act precludes determination of the appropriateness 
of regular class placement without simultaneous consideration of 
supplementary aids and services that could render such place-
ment appropriate,135 close observance of the requirements of the 
Act should minimize this conflict in most cases. Ideally, provision 
of proper support services would greatly reduce the special bur-
dens on classroom teachers resulting from mainstreaming of a 
handicapped child.136 Of course, schools are likely to plead that 
fiscal constraints prohibit the reductions in class size or the hiring 
of additional personnel necessary to bring about this result. But 
courts have turned a deaf ear to such pleas in the past.137 To the 
extent that necessary funds may have to be diverted from other 
educational programs, the education of nonhand:icapped children 
may be affected. Nevertheless, this result is at least more equi-
table than placing the full burden of fiscal limitations on the 
educational rights of the handicapped child.138 
135 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B) (1976). Necessary supplementary aids and 
services would vary depending on the child. A learning disabled student might 
require the assistance of a special teacher who visits the normal classroom for 
a short period each day. A deaf student might require a full-time interpreter. 
136 The Act does not indicate to what extent-if any- a court may order 
changes in the regular classroom itself. In some cases, a reduction in class size 
may be preferable to - and less stigmatizing than - additional support services 
within the classroom. Though the Act's mainstreaming provision speaks of "s11p-
plementary aids and services," 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(B) (1976) (emphasis added), 
the power of a decisionmaker to grant appropriate relief would appear to em-
brace changes in the educational environment as well. Still, many decisionmakers 
may be reluctant to intrude so directly into local practices. In some districts, 
decisionmakers will not face this problem since teacher contracts require class 
size reductions where handicapped children are mainstreamed. See R. WEATHERLEY 
& M. LIPSKY, supra note 46, at 31 & n.69. 
137 See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d u58, u62 (4th 
Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 830 (1979) (Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), requires even "expensive" special services); Hair-
ston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. l8o, 184 (S.D. W. Va. 1976); cf. Barnes v. Converse 
College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 637-39 (D.S.C. 1977) (noting that the possible financial 
consequence of future demands by other handicapped students is not a valid con-
sideration for the court). 
Advocates have responded to the inadequate funds defense by pointing out 
that it may be more costly not to educate the handicapped, since failure to train 
children for a self-sufficient life may lead them to rely on public assistance. See 
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 1425, 1433· 
138 Cf. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972) ("The 
inadequacies of the [school system] cannot be permitted to bear more heavily 
on the ... handicapped child than on the normal child."). 
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C. Program Decisions: Defining "Appropriate" Education 
At the center of many complaints will be a conflict over the 
nature and quality of services to which a handicapped child is 
entitled. Parents will assert that the law requires certain services 
to be provided. The school representatives - aware of the con-
straints of their own budget 139 - will contend that "appropriate" 
means something less.140 
The language of the Act provides no clear guidelines for re-
solving such a conflict.141 Judges and hearing officers must de-
velop standards for evaluating the facts of individual cases. It 
seems possible to suggest a few general propositions that might 
lend direction to their inquiry. To begin with, it seems clear that 
"appropriate" cannot mean the best possible education that a 
school could provide if given access to unlimited funds. At the 
same time, it undoubtedly means more than simply opening the 
doors of the regular classroom to those capable of entering and 
learning without special assistance. The Act surely contemplates 
a standard of appropriateness somewhere between these two ex-
tremes. 
Beyond this almost self-evident conclusion, it is difficult to 
formulate an abstract standard of appropriateness that provides a 
convenient measuring rod against which to compare the needs of 
widely divergent individuals. A helpful standard must be one 
which recognizes individual learning capacity and determines the 
extent to which that capacity will be developed. An ideal system 
would be designed to achieve the maximum development of the 
intellectual capacity of every child. A more practicable standard 
might be one which de.fined appropriateness in relation to the 
actual level of educational services provided for most children 
within a given school system.142 Under such a standard, an ap-
propriate education for a particular child would require services 
aimed at developing the child's intellectual capacity to the same 
139 See note 43 supra. 
140 In some instances, school officials may oppose a parental complaint for 
political reasons, finding it easier to demand additional funds from local govern-
ment when they can show that a court has ordered the expenditure. 
141 See 20 U.S.C. § I40I(I8) (I976). 
142 Of course, such a standard permits inequities between children in different 
systems. One could argue that "appropriate" must have a fixed meaning for all 
systems. But, given the tradition of local funding of education, and the reluctance 
of courts to interfere with that system, see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 4u U.S. I '(I973), it seems unlikely that passage of the Act will create 
uniformity for the handicapped where none exists for other children. Decision-
maker.i will be more likely to bend their notions of appropriateness according 
to local conditions. Cf. 80 HARv. L. REv. 898, 902 (I967) (judges likely to be in-
fluenced in determination of what is possible by present level of facilities). 
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degree that the school sought to develop the "normal" abilities 
of its nonhandicapped students.143 
Thus, an appropriate education for a physically handicapped 
child with a normal intellectual capacity would be a program de-
signed to promote academic achievement roughly equivalent to 
that of her nonhandicapped peers.144 This standard might require 
only that the school make classrooms accessible to the student and 
provide for medical needs that might interfere with classroom 
performance.145 An appropriate education for a blind child with 
normal intelligence would require sufficient auditory or braille 
instruction to permit academic performance commensurate with 
normal achievement of nonhandicapped children. 
A similar - though perhaps more difficult - comparison 
might be made in cases of children whose handicaps impair their 
intellectual capacity. For example, a school system that provides 
the best in modern facilities and a low student-teacher ratio for 
its nonhandicapped children could justify neither a failure to pro-
vide the best available support services to a mildly retarded child 
nor a high student-teacher ratio in special programs for the 
severely retarded. Conversely, a poor school district which edu-
cated all of its children in overcrowded classrooms with limited 
facilities might not be required to off er the most scientifically 
advanced programs to .its handicapped students.146 In all circum-
stances, this concept of appropriateness would at least require an 
equitable sharing of educational resources. Of course, equality 
would mean more than equal spending for all students; 147 it 
143 Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)(1) (1977) (Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), requires education which meets the needs of the 
handicapped as adequately as the needs of the nonhandicapped are met). 
144 An appropriate physical education program for such a child might be 
determined through a rough comparison to the level of facilities made available 
to nonhandicapped students. 
145 Cf. Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. l8o (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (Section 504 
of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), requires school to provide 
assistance necessary to permit child with spina bifida to remain in regular class-
room). 
146 Of course, the notion of appropriateness, like equal protection, may in-
clude a requirement of some minimal level of education in all cases. Cf. San 
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4n U.S. 11 37 (1973) (noting possibil-
ity of equal protection violation where school fails to provide the opportunity "to 
acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech 
and of full participation in the political process"). 
147The Act requires more than equal spending. The funds received under 
the Act are to be used to meet "excess costs." 20 U.S.C. § l4r4(a) (I) (1976). 
"Excess costs" are costs over and above the school's average annual per pupil ex-
penditures. Id. at § 1401(20) (1976); cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) 
(school must do more than provide equal services where non-English-speaking 
students received no meaningful education without special instruction). 
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would require equal opportunity for individual development. 
In the end, judges and hearing officers must look to a wide 
variety of sources for their conclusions. They may rely on a con-
sensus of expert opinion where any exists. They may look to 
practices in similar districts or neighboring states. In future 
years they may look to previous decisions of courts and hearing 
officers as precedents. The development of a "common law" for 
decisionmaking under the Act would eliminate much of the 
ambiguity of the current standards. There is, however, the danger 
that it may rigidify those standards and stifle the potential for 
creative response under the Act. Hearing officers should be care-
ful to regard earlier decisions only as general guidelines for 
principled decisionmaking and not as mandates that a particular 
program is the appropriate placement for any child with a par-
ticular type of handicap. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act has set the 
stage for judges and hearing officers to take an active role in the 
intimate details of educational decisionmaking while seeking to 
safeguard the rights of the handicapped. The success of that 
venture will depend in large part on the ability of these decision-
makers to fashion standards for individual cases in the absence 
of clear statutory guidelines. Until more precise regulations or 
judicial interpretations add new substance to those guidelines, 
their task will be exceedingly difficult. At the same time, unless 
special steps are taken to increase the accessibility of the com-
plaint system for all parents, the promise of the Act may be an 
empty one for many children. 
Still, in the past courts have risen to the challenge of turning 
vague language into meaningful guidelines for conduct,148 and 
judges have been particularly scrupulous in assuring that pro-
cedural safeguards provide real protection rather than meaningless 
formality.149 In entrusting courts with the ultimate power to re-
view the appropriateness of individual programs, Congress has 
placed great faith in such judicial virtues. Only further experience 
with judicial enforcement of the statute will indicate whether that 
faith was well-placed. 
148 See Friendly, In Praise of Erie -And of the New Federal Common Law, 
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-22 (1964). 
149 E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
